The rule of law in the function of human dignity by Zekavica, Radomir G.
Submitted: 2019-03-27
Published: 2019-07-17
UDK: 342.7
172.13
340.131 
doi:10.5937/nabepo24-21119
NBP 2019, 24(2): 17–28
THE RULE OF LAW IN THE FUNCTION  
OF HUMAN DIGNITY1
Radomir G. Zekavica2
University of Criminal Investigation and Police Studies, Belgrade
Abstract: Human dignity is the universal value of human beings. They have 
this value because they are potentially mindful beings. This does not mean that 
every man is mindful, but that every man can be mindful, and therefore di-
gnified. It makes possible for people to understand and accept themselves and 
others as a purpose. Therefore, the cognitive power of people and the ability to 
impose on themselves the moral principles of conduct themselves are the basic 
prerequisite for dignity. People can be their own legislators, which means free 
beings. An important step in achieving human dignity is human will. Human 
actions must be in line with the mental knowledge of a priori principles of acti-
on, the essence of which is reflected in the ethics of duty, towards oneself and 
others. Hence, dignity has two very important aspects. The first concerns the 
attitude towards oneself, and the other relates to others. As a legal requirement, 
human dignity is the duty of the state and individuals to refrain from all acts 
that violate human dignity. By virtue of the rule of law, the state fulfils its duty 
of protection of dignity as a system of laws containing prohibitions of violation 
of human dignity. However, the fundamental role of the rule of law in the pro-
tection of human dignity should not be seen solely in the set of a ban on such 
conduct. The rule of law, understood as the ideal of the rule of mindful laws, 
can provide much more through the standardization of social relations that 
affirm the conditions for survival of the individual as a free and dignified being 
and create conditions for the free, creative and responsible life of citizens. This 
implies the affirmation of not only legal-political, but also socio-economic pre-
conditions for the dignified life of people.
Keywords: human dignity, the rule of law, mindfulness, Kant, reason, impulses.
1 This paper resulted from research on the project Development of institutional capacities, standards 
and procedures for fighting organized crime and terrorism in the context of international integration 
(no. 179045), financed by the Ministry of education, science and technological progress of the Re-
public of Serbia.
2 radomir.zekavica@kpu.edu.rs
Zekavica, R. (2019). The rule of law in the function of human dignity
NBP • Journal of Criminalistics and Law
Vol. 24, No. 2
18
INTRODUCTION
Dignity is one of the fundamental 
terms in legal and philosophical theory. 
At the same time, it is one of those terms 
about which it is not easy to end debate 
and give the final word. As it is usual with 
terms which indicate values, it is a very 
challenging task to determine their pre-
cise meaning. The thing that makes it so 
challenging is the implied agreement on 
the content of the value at hand. It is not 
easy to achieve, because values cannot 
be subject to exact scientific studies, but 
are rather open to interpretation by di-
fferent social subjects, who inevitably 
include their own moral values into the-
ir interpretations. In addition to this, it 
is not an easy task because the meaning 
of the term dignity has changed throu-
ghout history, and is still changing. Ge-
nerally speaking, the meaning of dignity 
has evolved from the view common in 
the old and middle ages when it was seen 
as an attribute of a certain social class 
(nobility, priests), to the modern age, 
when it is accepted as a universal value 
of a human being (see: Franeta, 2015). 
Even today, when it is clear that dignity 
should not be related to social status, its 
meaning is still not completely clear and 
precise. On the contrary, the meaning is 
getting wider, so that now, in addition 
to human dignity (Mitrović, 2016; Mar-
janović, 2013)3. we speak about national 
dignity, dignity of science, art and cultu-
re, dignity of animals, and even plants. 
(Rosen, 2015:23)4. Because of this, whe-
never dignity is discussed, we must first 
give an answer to the question of what 
is understood under dignity and what 
kind of dignity we are speaking about. 
This must be done especially when we 
want to relate the term to another one, 
which may also be multifaceted, such as 
the notion of the rule of law. 
From the title of this paper alone, we 
can easily notice that it primarily fo-
cuses on human dignity. We have thus 
narrowed down the meaning to the man 
as someone who has or may have digni-
ty. However, the main goal of this paper 
is to determine in which way the rule of 
law can serve human dignity. This inclu-
des not only our choice of the core mea-
ning of human dignity and our attempt 
at defining it as precisely as possible, but 
also determining the meaning of the 
rule of law, so that we could analyze in 
what way the rule of law can serve hu-
man dignity.
3 Which also has its different subdivisions, such 
as natural, social, legal or religious and ideologi-
cal varieties of human dignity.
4 The Ig Nobel Peace Prize 2018 was awarded to 
the Swiss federal ethic committee for non-hu-
man biotechnology and the citizens of Switzer-
land for adopting the legal principle according to 
which plants have dignity.
THE BASIC MEANING OF HUMAN DIGNITY
 What is human dignity? Simply put, 
it is a value possessed by a human being. 
While this obviously does not give an 
appropriate response to the question at 
hand, it does put dignity in the category 
of values connected to humans. The key 
question is: what does this value imply? 
Why do humans, and do all humans ne-
cessarily have this value, and can it be 
lost and in which way? Also, one of the 
many questions arising from considera-
tions about dignity is whether dignity 
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is a derived value, or a value per se. In 
the former case, dignity is a term that 
denotes what we get in return for respe-
cting some other values – life, freedom, 
property, etc. In the latter case, dignity 
is a value in its own right, with a specific 
meaning and content, so that - in social 
relations and life in general - dignity can 
be upheld or denied through a simple vi-
olation of the value and its meaning. 
In an attempt to determine the 
substance of human dignity, we must 
start from the holder of this value – a hu-
man. A basic anthropological characteri-
stic of human beings is that they are not 
only beings of impulse, but also beings 
of reason. Our impulses make us simi-
lar, and our reason distinguishes us from 
animals. Most human impulses (impulse 
for eating, drinking, sexuality, etc.) serve 
to preserve a human and his existence. 
They serve human self-preservation, so, 
in that sense, they have a positive and 
creative potential for humans. In addi-
tion to these impulses, humans are also 
guided by impulses that have a destructi-
ve potential both for themselves and for 
others. This ambivalent nature of man is 
best represented by Freud’s division into 
two basic types of impulses - eros and 
thanatos, the first having a positive-cre-
ationist nature – the impulse of life (the-
se are impulses of self-preservation and 
reproduction – sexual impulse/libido), 
and the other one being of a destructi-
ve nature – the impulse of death (ma-
nifests itself through aggression towar-
ds oneself or others, the destruction of 
everything created) (Freud, 1994). This, 
potentially destructive, nature of man is 
clearly highlighted by Erich Fromm who 
wrote that human history is a record of 
incredible destructivity and cruelty, and 
that human aggression, it seems, far sur-
passes the aggression of the humans’ 
animal ancestors; a human, contrary to 
most animals, is a true killer (Fromm, 
1989:11). 
Fortunately, in addition to the impul-
sive (irrational) side, humans also have a 
reasonable (rational) side of their perso-
nality. This is also the human personali-
ty trait that separates humans from ani-
mals most clearly, because it gives them 
the ability to consciously grasp their own 
existence and role in different forms of 
social communities and, thereby, in di-
fferent forms of social relations. The 
most important role of human reason 
is to give people rationality. The term 
‘reason’ was, throughout the history of 
philosophy, determined in different 
ways and was often mixed with the term 
‘rationality’. Ancient Greeks made no 
difference between understanding and 
reason, but later philosophy often saw 
understanding as a lower step of cogni-
tion as compared to reason. According 
to Kant, understanding and reason are 
different levels of cognitive ability and 
together with experience account for the 
overall cognitive potential of humans. 
“All of our (human) knowledge,” thinks 
Kant “begins with the senses, proceeds 
then to understanding, and ends with 
reason.” He claims that there is nothing 
in us above reason that could process the 
material of our observations and bring 
it under the supreme unity of our tho-
ughts. (Kant, 1976:222). 
This short review of some aspects of 
human nature serves to help us under-
stand the basic source of human dignity. 
That source has to be found in the very 
nature of man and the attributes of hu-
mans that allow every human to enjoy 
dignity. These attributes are definitely 
not impulses, especially not those whi-
ch have destructive potential. Impulses 
that come from the sphere of irrational 
cannot help humans or animals recogni-
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ze values. The only attribute of human 
nature which makes every man capable 
of recognizing the meaning, content and 
importance of a value is reason, i.e. the 
human ability of being rational. Becau-
se of this Kant is completely right when 
he says that only rational beings are ca-
pable of the highest level of knowledge, 
which presents itself in the recognition 
of a priori principles of action (faculty of 
the practical reason). Everything in na-
ture, according to Kant, acts according 
to laws, but only rational beings are able 
to act according to the representations 
of laws, or according to principles, and 
to have will. The idea of the objective 
principle (the objective law of reason), 
which governs will, is called an order, 
and the formulation of orders is called 
the imperative (Kant, 2016:46-47). For 
the topic of human dignity, Kant’s for-
mulation of two categorical imperatives 
as orders which require action which is 
objectively necessary in itself, regardless 
of any other purpose, is crucial. The first 
– act always so that the maxim of your 
will may always simultaneously be con-
sidered as a universal principle of law-
making; the second – act in such a way 
that you treat humanity, whether in your 
own person or in any other person, never 
merely as a means to an end, but always 
as the end (Kant, 1979:53; 2016:74). 
Recognition of these principles is the 
act of reason, the result of the rationali-
ty of humans, and when rational beings 
set these behavior principles for them-
selves, they act as autonomous beings in 
the realm of purposes. In the realm of 
purposes, Kant believes, everything has 
either some price or some dignity. The 
things that have a price are such that we 
can replace them with something else as 
their equivalents; conversely, things that 
are higher than any price, that do not 
allow for any equivalents, have dignity 
(Kant, 2016:82). It is exactly this ability 
of rational beings to be autonomous, i.e. 
to act as their own lawmakers - guided 
by a priori moral principles of the pra-
ctical reason - that makes human beings 
dignified. As such, it is above any price 
because it is an end in itself. Hence, the 
order from the second categorical impe-
rative clearly relates to the duty to treat 
ourselves but also every other rational 
being as an end and not as means. Such 
a man, according to Kant, is not just his 
own lawmaker whose will is determined 
by the a priori principles of the mind 
(which at the same time makes him a 
free being), but he is also a man capable 
of having morality and dignity – “mora-
lity and a man if he is capable of having 
morality, are the only things capable of 
having dignity” (Ibid: 83). 
Bearing in mind these words of Kant, 
we will try to answer the questions from 
the beginning of this chapter as precisely 
as possible, in order to move on to the 
analysis of the ways in which the rule of 
law can serve the preservation of human 
dignity. First of all, it is clear that hu-
man beings enjoy dignity because they 
are rational beings. This of course does 
not mean that every man is rational, but 
that every man can be rational and the-
reby dignified. It is therefore the capacity, 
i.e. the potential for rationality that ma-
kes human beings dignified. Rationality 
allows humans to comprehend and ac-
cept themselves and others as an end. So, 
human cognitive power and the ability to 
use it in order to impose moral principles 
of action on themselves are the key pre-
requisites of dignity. Due to this, animals 
cannot have dignity within the same me-
aning of the term that we apply to hu-
mans. Because of their lack of awarene-
ss about their own value or the value of 
others, animals cannot keep their dignity 
through the actions aimed at themselves 
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or other animals. The dignity that ani-
mals can enjoy or can be granted comes 
from the good will of humans who may 
offer it to them through appropriate tre-
atment which would help keep animals 
from suffering, as suffering and pain are 
the things that they can definitely feel 
and this, by definition, violates the digni-
ty of the being going through it.
Thanks to rationality, humans can 
be their own lawmakers, and thereby 
free beings. An important step towar-
ds achieving human dignity is the one 
concerning will. The will, i.e. actions of 
humans must be in agreement with the 
rational recognition of a priori princi-
ples of action, whose essence is reflected 
in the ethics of duty towards oneself and 
towards others. Hence we see that digni-
ty has two very important aspects. The 
first concerns the relationship everyone 
has with themselves, and the other the-
ir relationship with others. Both of the-
se concern the duty of a rational being 
to accept oneself and others as an end, 
and not just as a means. Following Kant, 
this fact is the most clearly highlighted 
by famous German lawyer Günter Dürig 
in his statement that “human dignity is 
violated when a human is lowered to be-
ing an object, pure tool, of a replaceable 
importance” (Franeta, 2011:834). The 
purpose of achieving dignity is, therefo-
re, in our duty not to treat ourselves and 
others as means. Treating someone as a 
means implies that we are treating them 
in such a way that their interests (their 
desires or wellbeing) are given no im-
portance of their own (Rosen, 2015: 80). 
This dual relation of duty – towards 
oneself and towards others, makes di-
gnity a specific value. Unlike other va-
lues, such as life, freedom, physical or 
psychological integrity and many others, 
dignity is lost the very moment we stop 
acknowledging that value by our acti-
ons not only towards ourselves but also 
towards others. For example, life as a 
value remains with someone who takes 
someone else’s life. This is also the case 
with freedom and countless other va-
lues. Dignity is, on the other hand, lost 
not only when taken from ourselves, but 
also when we take it away from others. 
It is important to note that when we 
treat ourselves as a means, the fact that 
we are doing so willingly is not enough 
of a reason for us to keep our dignity. 
In other words, someone can decide to 
turn themselves into a means, but the 
fact that they made that decision witho-
ut the coercion of others is not sufficient 
for their dignity to be preserved. Altho-
ugh autonomy is an important factor of 
dignity, dignity cannot be reduced to it. 
Autonomy is not sufficient because it can 
be abused by someone putting themse-
lves in the position of a means. In doing 
so, such a person automatically loses his/
her dignity. 
It is a completely separate issue whet-
her or not and when the state has the right 
to stop actions like these by individuals.
In support of the debate on this su-
bject it is useful to cite the example that 
Michael Rosen mentions in his book Di-
gnity. Namely, it is about the case of Ma-
nuel Vakenem, a person with dwarfism, 
who was prevented by the local govern-
ment from participating as an object of 
throwing in a competition in the laun-
ching of people with dwarfism that was 
supposed to take place at a discotheque 
in the French town of Morzine Avoriage 
in 1995. The reason that caused the local 
authorities to make this decision was the 
assessment that such an act constituted 
a violation of human dignity and at the 
same time a form of violation of public 
order and citizen security. After an ap-
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pellate procedure, the Administrative 
Court of Versailles annulled the mayor’s 
decision, only for the State Council, as 
the highest judicial instance, to stand by 
the local authorities and confirm the de-
cision on the ban. The case ended before 
the UN Human Rights Committee whi-
ch also rejected Vakenem’s appeal (Ro-
sen, 2015:65-68).
This example is useful because it po-
ints to the potential role of the state in 
the protection of human dignity and at 
the same time raises the question of its 
relationship to the rule of law. Namely, 
it is perfectly clear that the state has the 
duty to provide, by means of legal acts, 
the protection of people from the acts 
which could violate their dignity. This 
duty is clearly stated by the famous provi-
sion of the German Basic Law from 1949 
which stipulates that “Human dignity is 
inviolable. Respecting and protecting it is 
the duty of every country’s government” 
(Article 1). The basic manner in which 
a state does so within the system of the 
rule of law is by imposing legal restricti-
ons on actions of individuals and gover-
nment representatives whose goal is the 
protection of human dignity against all 
the actions that represent forms of its 
violation. In his comments on the abo-
ve mentioned article of the constitution, 
Dürig offers a concrete list of violations 
of human dignity such  as: open injury 
(mass exile and genocide in which a man 
is lowered to being an animal or item); 
cruel punishment; subordinating a person 
to objects and denial of legal subjectivi-
ty to humans, while giving the same to 
objects; turning a man into an ‘object’ by 
the state authorities (using chemical and 
psycho-technical means for extracting 
the truth, denial of legal hearings, etc.); 
violation of intimacy (without which the-
re is no personal integrity and identity); 
depersonalization (heterologous insemi-
nation); various forms of honor violation; 
life below the basic existential conditi-
ons which deprives the man of his subje-
ctivity (life without dignity, the so-called 
hand-to-mouth lifestyle) (Dürig 1998, 
according to: Mitrović, 2016: 30; Frane-
ta, 2011: 835). 
The key question here is whether or 
not the state has and - if it does - when 
does it have the duty to stop actions by 
which individuals violate their own di-
gnity. The Vakenem case points out the 
delicacy of a situation like this. On the 
one hand, there is the need to prote-
ct the autonomy of an individual and 
their right to freely make decisions on 
actions that concern them, yet, on the 
other, there is the obligation of the sta-
te to protect human dignity. There is no 
doubt that the state would go the way 
of paternalism if it took upon itself to 
protect individuals from all actions by 
which they could violate their dignity. In 
such a case, it would be completely le-
gitimate to call for a ban on alcohol be-
cause consuming it can lead individuals 
to situations wherein they do not act in 
a dignified manner. On the other hand, 
reducing human dignity to the request 
for respecting personal autonomy repre-
sents an introduction to a very dange-
rous practice whose outlines can clearly 
be seen in the modern society, where we 
can witness the efforts of transhumanists 
to - by calling for the autonomy of choi-
ce - allow the use of increasingly advan-
ced bioethical measures with the goal of 
“improving human nature” (see: Djur-
ković, 2018). Ruth Macklin supports this 
with her thesis that dignity is a useless 
concept and that it means nothing more 
than respect towards persons and their 
autonomy (Macklin, 2002:1419).
If we wanted to outline the obligati-
ons that a state has in protecting human 
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dignity in the cases of potential clashes 
between dignity and autonomy, then it 
would be good to return to the Vakenem 
case. Preventing someone from acting in 
an undignified way towards themselves 
would be an extreme example of pater-
nalism, unless they were violating the 
dignity of the entire category of humans 
which they belong to with their actions. 
This was the reason that made the aut-
horities, including the UN Human Ri-
ghts Committee, refuse Vakenem’s appe-
al. It was clear that his actions violated 
the dignity of all people suffering from 
dwarfism by using his physical disability 
as a way to turn himself into an object of 
entertainment in a contest of throwing 
people with dwarfism. In the same way, 
it is legitimate to ban all other actions 
that in a similar way affect not just the 
person who voluntarily accepts undigni-
fied behavior, but also other members of 
the same category of humans (for exam-
ple, banning prostitution). However, 
in the situations where an act concerns 
only the person who commits it, with 
no connection to other individuals in 
any way, then a state intervention would 
undoubtedly be an extreme form of pa-
ternalism and would, as such, open the 
door for a thorough redefinition of the 
role of state in the modern society. 
It would be wrong to reduce the role 
of state in the protection of human di-
gnity solely to relevant legal restrictions. 
These are definitely important because 
they show the boundaries that indivi-
duals can go to, primarily in their acti-
ons towards others. In the system of the 
rule of law and the lawful state they at 
the same time draw the line to which the 
state authorities can take actions towards 
citizens, thereby fulfilling the basic idea 
of the rule of law – that the authority is to 
be limited by its own laws. However, the 
role of the rule of law in the protection 
of human dignity is not just negative, in 
terms of drawing boundaries for actions 
of individuals and the government. It can 
be seen in the affirmation of appropriate 
conditions and circumstances in which 
the protection of human dignity is po-
ssible. It is here that we can see the most 
important contribution of the rule of law 
to the protection of human dignity, and 
in order for it to be completely clear we 
have to determine the meaning of the 
rule of law as precisely as possible. 
THE RULE OF LAW – THE IDEAL  
OF THE RULE OF THOUGHTFUL LAWS
Unlike the idea of human dignity, 
whose meaning has evolved throughout 
history, the meaning of the idea of the 
rule of law has remained virtually un-
changed. It can be summarized as the 
request for the public authority to be li-
mited by laws. The change in the inter-
pretation of this idea throughout history 
resulted from the way in which people 
answered the question as to whether or 
not it was enough for the authority to 
be limited by any laws. For the ancient 
Greeks, as the creators of the idea of the 
rule of law, it implied the rule of not any 
laws, but the laws founded in the reason. 
With the goal of setting up a rule based 
on reason and common interests, it was 
crucial for the Greeks to set up a system 
of power in which, by using prudent 
laws, the negative aspects of the nature 
of political powers were decreased, whi-
ch meant setting up a system where laws 
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were not instrumental as a mere tool of 
the government, but as a tool of rational 
and just rule. So, the goal of restraining 
the authority by laws was aimed at su-
ppressing its destructive potentials, and 
keeping it in within reasonable limits, in 
order for politics to be possible as a vir-
tue and for freedom as an opportunity for 
active inclusion of citizens in the political 
life of the polis. This is, in fact, how the 
substantial concept of the idea of the rule 
of law came to be as the idea that does 
not ignore the issue of the quality of the 
laws that the limitations of state authori-
ties should rest on. Many centuries later, 
in German legal theory, there appeared 
the concept which had the same goal – 
to limit the state authority by laws, but it 
gave a completely different interpretation 
of the question of substantial quality of 
the laws that the limitation rests on. This 
gave rise to the formal concept of the rule 
of law in a state (Rechtsstaat) that does 
not go into the content of the laws, but 
is satisfied with their formal correctness. 
This formal correctness (validity of an 
action and the competence to enact laws) 
necessarily leads to the validity and bin-
ding nature of legal rules, so that the rule 
of law in a state exists when these criteria 
are met, and the authorities are bound by 
those rules.
The answer to the question of whet-
her the idea of the rule of law should 
be reduced to the formal or substantial 
concept is very important for understan-
ding its role in the protection of human 
dignity. As we have seen, human digni-
ty constitutes a value that human beings 
have because of the rational and moral 
potentials of their nature. Accepting the 
thesis that in order for the rule of law to 
exist, it is sufficient that only the formal 
rightness of the decisions and acts of the 
state authorities is present, would in fact 
mean accepting the possibility that the 
rule of law exists even when the autho-
rities are violating or brutally endange-
ring the basic values of a human being, 
and that the only prerequisite for this is 
that such values are not protected by law. 
The formal concept of the rule of law as 
such cannot be an adequate framework 
for the protection of human dignity. An 
adequate form of this protection can 
only be achieved with the rule of law ta-
ken in the substantial sense. As such, it 
is the ideal of the order in which the law 
is in the function of keeping an indivi-
dual as a free and dignified being within 
a political community and creating con-
ditions that allow citizens free, creative 
and responsible development of all their 
potentials.  
This purpose of the rule of law was 
first defined at the so called Chicago 
Colloquium in 1957. One of the promi-
nent participants at this gathering, Jo-
lowicz, pointed out that the fundamental 
purpose of the rule of law was to create 
such a community that would in the best 
possible way help individuals develop 
and accomplish their potentials as hu-
man beings. The importance of the rule 
of law lies in its final goal – creating po-
ssibilities for individual members of the 
community that will allow their deve-
lopment through free but also responsi-
ble choice between different alternatives 
(Jolowicz, 1959). The common attribute 
of the many concepts of the rule of law 
was pointed out by Hamson, who said 
that the rule of law is a tool of an organi-
zed society which has a goal of creating a 
community in which a man is enabled to 
fulfill himself through the complete de-
velopment of his capabilities. The great 
resources of a society are the energies of 
the humans that make it up. The goal is 
to allow and encourage coordinated re-
lease of those energies, and the method 
is allowing human beings to make res-
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ponsible and efficient decisions and en-
couraging the development of their legal 
and practical capacities for making these 
decisions. The rule of law is the pheno-
menon and the mark of an organized, 
free society (Hamson, 1959). 
The key question is: in what way can 
the rule of law accomplish these noble 
goals? It can accomplish them through a 
certain quality of standardization of so-
cial relations that has to start from respe-
cting all rational principles of authority. 
Namely, the contact point between 
the rule of law and human dignity is ra-
tionality. It gives humans that specific 
quality, i.e. the possibility of human di-
gnity. It is the confirmation of the hig-
hest potentials of human cognition that 
allows for comprehending not only a 
priori principles of action but also for 
comprehending the principles that the 
legal norms regulating human relati-
ons should be based on. It should start 
with affirming the principles that all 
individuals should follow in regard to 
themselves and others (respecting hu-
man beings as end), but should also be 
guided by another, more general goal 
that is, in our opinion, the pure emana-
tion of rationality. That goal is human 
creativity. Creativity should be taken as 
a value per se. It is not pure action, but 
action that leads towards progress, i.e. 
towards the thing that a mindful person 
can only understand as individual and 
public good (Ignatieff, 2006:  24)5. So, 
mindful standardization must be dedi-
cated to creating conditions for creative 
5 A somewhat similar principle can be seen in 
the writings of Michael Ignatieff who, starting 
from the historical experience (especially the 
atrocities of World War II), speaks of the indi-
vidual ability of work as a minimum of the pro-
tection that the concept of human rights should 
provide. However, stricly interpreting this, the 
ability of work is a neutral value, because we can 
work in different ways and with different goals. 
Ignatieff, in fact, defines it as such.
development of the human personality, 
and thereby society as a whole (creativi-
ty as a guiding and general principle6). 
The principle of mindfulness, applied to 
the logics of societal norms, should be 
defined as a request for all societal relati-
ons to be regulated in a way that prevents 
destructivity in the broadest meaning of 
the word (either exterior destructivity – 
when rules give individuals the authori-
ty to violate the rights and freedoms of 
others, or internal – when they impose 
auto-destruction). The rule of law, taken 
as the ideal of the rule of mindful laws, 
should provide the conditions for socie-
tal relations to be regulated in the above 
mentioned way and thereby allow every 
individual to develop his/her creative 
potentials, which will by default uphold 
human dignity.
The quality of the legal norms pertai-
ning to social relations implies a specific 
matching content. Human dignity can 
hardly be achieved with mere procla-
mation of rational principles and goals. 
In order for the rule of law to be in the 
function of human dignity, its laws must 
contain a specified minimum of rights 
that create the conditions for accomplis-
hing human dignity. 
These rights can, in principle, be di-
vided into two basic categories. The ones 
that are supposed to provide the auto-
nomy of an individual and the ones that 
are supposed to provide favourable con-
ditions for the development of all poten-
tials of a human personality, which in 
turn leads to the affirmation of human 
dignity. The first group contains the right 
6 Otherwise, if destruction would be allowed to 
be the guiding principle, it would, as a final out-
come, necessarily guide towards the destruction 
of those who allowed such a principle. In other 
words, if destruction became a general princi-
ple, in the spirit of Kant’s categorical imperative, 
it would lead to the destruction of society as a 
whole.
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to vote above all. It is necessary becau-
se without the participation of citizens 
in political processes, an individual is a 
servant, and not a citizen. The right to 
vote gives the minimal autonomy thro-
ugh willing choice of an individual and 
giving consent without which obeying 
laws would be pure coercion and thereby 
the negation of the rational potential of 
human beings and their dignity. The 
second group contains the rights that 
are supposed to provide the necessary 
conditions for existence and creative 
development of the human personality. 
This group includes the basic personal 
rights such as the right to life, physical 
freedom, physical and psychological in-
tegrity, fair trial, privacy and property, 
but also numerous social, economic and 
cultural rights. Namely, for the full deve-
lopment of human potentials and digni-
ty it is not enough for us just to live or 
move freely. The developmental poten-
tials of a human being require the ful-
filment of numerous other conditions in 
order to come to their fullest – the right 
to work, a decent life standard, health 
care and social welfare, not to mention 
countless cultural (education, partici-
pation in cultural events) and collective 
rights that allow the individuals within 
these communities free creative ability 
and development (e.g. the right of ethnic 
minorities to use their own language). It 
is in this field that ideological and do-
ctrinary differences in the interpretation 
of these rights (their content and the way 
of accomplishing them) are much more 
prominent, because they encompass the 
rights whose importance and necessi-
ty, in the context of the developmental 
potentials of human beings, can be in-
terpreted differently depending on the 
social circumstances and the cultural 
model at hand. Because of this, caution 
is necessary and the choice of these ri-
ghts, as well as the manner of their reali-
zation should be adjusted to the cultural 
specifics of a given society (more on this: 
Zekavica, 2018).
Finally, in order for the rule of law to 
be in the function of human dignity we 
need institutional and procedural gua-
rantees for the realization of these rights. 
Without them, the rule of law is a colle-
ction of praiseworthy proclamations, but 
of no real importance. Full protection of 
human dignity is not possible without 
an active role of the state that will pro-
tect it in practice, which in turn is not 
possible without an important prerequi-
site for the rule of law – independent ju-
diciary and judicial control of legislative 
and executive branches of authority.
CONCLUSION
It took a lot of time for human digni-
ty to gain the status of a value granted 
to every human being. Human dignity 
has travelled a long path of evolution 
from the point where it was first seen 
as a property of a certain social class, to 
the understanding that sees it as a value 
inherent to every human being. A signi-
ficant contribution to this was given by 
discussions about human dignity in the 
philosophical and ethical studies which, 
starting from Cicero and Thomas Aqui-
nas to Pico della Mirandola and finally 
Immanuel Kant highlighted the uni-
versality of human dignity as a value of 
every human per se. This evolution was 
accompanied by the evolution of studies 
on human rights and the awareness that 
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- from one’s birth - every man has na-
tural rights that are to be respected by 
others, and especially by the state aut-
horities. This connection between natu-
ral rights and human dignity can most 
clearly be seen in the writings of Ernst 
Bloch, who saw the legacy of the natural 
law doctrine and Marxist intention of 
economic liberation of the individual as 
the only way towards achieving human 
dignity (Bloch, 1977). 
The crucial moment in acknowled-
ging human dignity as a universal value 
of a human being occurred only when it 
was defined as a concrete legal require-
ment and principle. This moment arri-
ved with the first citizen revolutions that 
marked the beginning of the standardi-
zation of human dignity and its being 
turned into a real value. It was only with 
the standardization of the idea of hu-
man dignity that it was possible to talk 
about the concrete duty of the state to 
protect it. Following World War II and 
the horrific examples of violation of the 
basic human rights, human dignity be-
came a fundamental constitutional prin-
ciple of modern states. Thus the rule of 
law, understood in its substantial sense, 
could also be in the function of its pro-
tection by providing legal protection of 
the rights and freedoms that allow every 
person to enjoy human dignity through 
legally defined obligations of the state in 
this area. Dürig was right when he cla-
imed that human dignity is an integral 
part of human rights and not a separate 
right. It is the core value of human rights 
and the highest constitutional principle 
that contains the essence of human ri-
ghts (Franeta, 2011:830). 
However, the core role of the rule of 
law in the protection of human rights 
should not be seen purely in the set of 
prohibitions banning actions that violate 
someone’s dignity (injury of honour or 
image, reducing a man to the level of an 
object or tool, violating one’s rights – to 
life, freedom, integrity, etc.). The rule of 
law, taken as the ideal of the rule of mi-
ndful laws (which it has been since the 
conception of the idea) can offer much 
more by regulating human relations so 
as to ensure the conditions for survival 
of the individual as a free and dignified 
being inside the political community 
and by creating conditions that allow ci-
tizens a free, creative and responsible de-
velopment of all of their potentials. This 
implies the affirmation of not only legal 
and political but also social-economic 
prerequisites for a dignified life of a man. 
Of course, we should not be naïve 
and believe that the rule of law, even in 
its ideal form and realization, can stop 
the violation of human dignity. Violati-
on of human dignity will exist until man 
changes himself – until he overcomes 
the impulsive-destructive potentials of 
his nature and develops a mindfulness 
of his own. This change is at the same 
time the hardest one, because it requi-
res serious effort from an individual. It 
requires a kind of individual revolution 
and accepting the highest ethical princi-
ples that must be supported by the pra-
ctical acts of the individuals’ will. Becau-
se of this, we must go back to Kant, but 
also all the other prominent ethicists in 
history (Socrates, Confucius, Christ), all 
of whom requested the same from all of 
us – change yourselves and see a value 
that should be respected both in yourse-
lves and in others.  
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